Plaintiff Jessica Martinez brought an action against defendant LA County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“MTA”) after one of its drivers refused to allow her to ride a bus with her “companion dog.”  Plaintiff’s complaint alleges causes of action for disability discrimination under Federal and State law.

The MTA made a settlement offer via CCP §998.  The offer stated MTA “offers to compromise the above-captioned matter for the total sum of $2,501.00, with each party bearing their own costs.”  After accepting MTA’s §998 offer, Plaintiff filed a motion to recover attorney’s fees under the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. Sections 12182, 12205) and California statues protecting the civil rights of the disabled.

Plaintiff argues that her acceptance of MTA’s settlement offer did not preclude her from recovering her statutory attorney fees because the offer only referred to “costs” and did not mention “attorney’s fees.”  MTA argues that in CCP §1033.5 (a)(10)(B) the term “costs” include statutory attorney fees.

The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees finding that statutory attorney’s fees are an item of costs pursuant to CCP §1033.5 (a)(10)(B) and are included in Defendant’s CCP §998 offer, which states  “each side to bear their own costs.”

The Court of Appeal in Engle v. Copenbarger & Copenbarger, LLP (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 165, 169, articulated a “bright-line rule”: A party who secures recovery by accepting a CCP §998 offer is entitled to recover costs and attorney’s fees unless they are excluded by the §998.  Likewise, unless the offer expressly states otherwise, an offer of monetary compromise under CCP §998 that excludes “costs” also excludes attorney’s fees.

The trial court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is affirmed.