In Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc.  09 C.D.O.S. 8174 (2009), Plaintiff filed suit against National Credit Acceptance, Inc. (“National”) alleging the company engaged in abusive debt collection practices to collect a debt they falsely believed she owed. National phoned Plaintiff at her place of employment and on her cell phone incessantly. The calls continued even after Plaintiff advised National to cease phoning her and to call MBNA (the original holder of the debt) to clear up the misunderstanding. Plaintiff alleges that the callers were often rude  in their conversations with her. Plaintiff filed suit for violations against Robbins-Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“Act”), and for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

§47(b)(2) of the Civil Code (“Code”) provides that a communication made in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding made by the litigants or other parties authorized by law aimed to achieve the objects of said litigation and that have some logical connection to the action are privileged. This privilege applies even where it occurs outside the confines of the courtroom and/or if no function of the Court or of its officers is involved. This privilege exists mainly for public policy reasons. It is intended to effectuate in the best way possible free access to the courts and the zealous advocacy of actions without the fear of derivative lawsuits. The privilege applies without regard to malice.

Defendant argues, in spite of a number of federal district court decisions which establish the contrary, that the litigation privilege bars the plaintiff’s claims under the Act. Defendant contends that because they instituted litigation in the form of arbitration to collect the alleged debt, any communications connected with that debt are privileged and defendant should not be subject to the lawsuit. The Court disagreed.

Further, it has long been established that the litigation privilege bars an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action. Plaintiff, argues that the litigation privilege should not apply in this case because she was not a party to the underlying litigation; National having failed to serve her with a notice of the arbitration proceeding.